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The modern corporation arose out of the trusts, mergers and 
holding companies of the late 19th century, an evolution that 
generated volatile political reactions. Though economists and 
business historians have analyzed the rise of the corporate 
form, they have neglected a second, related problem: Did 
attacks on the modern corporation depress business activity, 
as critics of Theodore Roosevelt and Howard Taft claimed? 
This paper has three aims. First, it covers the relevant ana-
lytical issues, including the effects of policy uncertainty on 
business investment. Second, it reviews the history of shift-
ing governmental policy in the light of its possible economic 
effects. Finally, it examines the statistical link between anti-
trust enforcement and business activity for the years 1 8 9 1 -
1914. Antitrust case filings against large firms coincided with 
business downturns, while filings against small firms did not. 
These findings provide supporting evidence though not deci-
sive proof for the charge that trust-busting hurt business 
activity. 
The rise of the trusts and the modern corporation has generated discussion about origins and effects. Critics contend that the 
cartels and mergers sought monopoly. Defenders focus on the hold-
ing companies and integrated large firms that ultimately emerged, 
and they view them as largely efficient responses to new methods of 
transportation, communication and manufacture. Commentators of 
each school also attribute a major influence to the law. New Jersey 
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laid the legal basis for the holding company in 1888, and federal 
antitrust law treated cartels more harshly than merged firms, espe-
cially until 1904. 1 
The origins and the long-run effects of the trusts constitute one 
question. Another related, but largely ignored problem concerns the 
effects of volatile and politically charged antitrust prosecution. Did 
the political struggle over the "trust and corporation problem" affect 
business confidence and the business cycle? What seems like an far-
fetched idea today had a wide following at the turn of the century. 
Theodore Roosevelt's famous trust-busting offers the best illus-
tration. The federal government sued Standard Oil in November of 
1906, and American Tobacco and Du Pont in July of 1907. Federal 
antitrust authorities also considered criminal charges against Stan-
dard and rejected Standard's offer to settle in 1907. Real output 
declined at the same time, by 20 percent from January 1907 to Jan-
uary 1908. Critics blamed Roosevelt, in particular his administra-
tion's attack on Standard Oil and the sort of rhetoric illustrated by 
his "malefactors of great wealth" speech. 
Historians of the Progressive Era know these charges well, but 
no one has evaluated them systematically. My aim is to examine the 
pertinent economic theory and the statistical and historical evidence. 
Could and did trust-busting hurt the economy, as the critics 
claimed? 
A number of economic mechanisms may link antitrust policies 
with the declines of output. For example, uncertainty about future 
economic policies may lower production and investment. This rela-
tionship was recognized informally by early economists and has 
recently received more formal underpinnings. Turn-of-the-century 
antitrust policy was in fact unstable, and since it concerned the fate 
of the modern corporation, arguably the most important innovation 
1 The vast literature on the rise of the trusts and the modern corporation defies sum-
mary. Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American 
Business (Cambridge, Mass., 1977), treats the development of new structures; Hans B. 
Thorelli, The Federal Antitrust Policy (Baltimore, Md., 1955), provides a useful early and 
Martin J. Sklar, The Corporate Reconstruction of American Capitalism, 1890-1916: The 
Market, the Law and Politics (Cambridge, U.K., 1988), a useful recent treatment of the 
political and legal reaction to the rise of the trusts; Leslie Hannah, The Rise of the Cor-
porate Economy (London, 1976), Alfred D. Chandler Jr., "The Development of Modern 
Management Structures in the U.S. and U.K./' in The Essential Alfred Chandler: Essays 
Toward a Historical Theory of Big Business, ed. Thomas K. McCraw, (Boston, Mass., 
1988) and Tony Freyer, "The Sherman Antitrust Act, Comparative Business Structure, 
and the Rule of Reason: America and Great Britain, 1880-1920," Iowa Law Review 74 
(July 1989): 991-1017, emphasize the legal attacks on loose business forms as a factor in 
the development of modern managerial structures in the U.S. 
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in the history of business, fluctuating antitrust may very well have 
affected the business cycle. 
Bread-and-butter antitrust issues—mergers, vertical restraints 
and cartels—offer other mechanisms by which shifts on the trust 
issue could affect long-term growth and hence current investment 
and consumption. The fixed-cost or cutthroat-competition explana-
tion for some cartels and mergers suggests an additional mechanism 
beyond policy uncertainty, and in fact complementary to it, that 
could explain why aggressive antitrust would hurt investment. 
Finally, according to arguments with a Schumpeterian flavor, 
actual and threatened legal restraints on fast-growing and innovative 
"center" firms such as Standard Oil and Du Pont would affect future 
growth prospects for the economy as a whole, and hence current 
investment and economic activity. Section I reviews the literature on 
the effects of business practices that the government has challenged 
on antitrust grounds, and Section II describes the mechanisms that 
could link fluctuating antitrust policy and the business cycle. 
The view that antitrust policy affected business conditions must 
also be confronted with empirical evidence. One major strand of this 
evidence is statistical. In the work below, I use federal antitrust case 
filings, in particular filings against large firms, to measure the sever-
ity of current and expected future policy. Though this is a crude 
measure, it is defensible. Another major strand of evidence is histor-
ical. The historical narrative illuminates the sources and nature of 
policy fluctuations, the political and economic importance of the 
trust issue, and whether business reacted to the shifting antitrust cli-
mate. Section III addresses my use of case filings, and Section IV 
presents a narrative of antitrust history and an analysis of enforce-
ment data. Section V provides some examples of business reaction to 
antitrust. 
The formal statistical work, Section VI, exploits the volatility of 
large-firm antitrust policy, a volatility that extends over the entire 
century of Sherman Act enforcement. 2 My regressions show that fil-
ings against major firms were associated with declines of aggregate 
output, while filings against other firms had a variable, perhaps 
weakly positive effect. Because no aggregate investment data exist 
for this period, I examine quarterly changes in aggregate output, 
and, as a proxy for investment, changes in pig iron production. I find 
2 William E. Kovacic, "Failed Expectations: The Troubled Past and Uncertain Future 
of the Sherman Act as a Tool for Deconcentration," Iowa Law Review 74 (July 1989): 
1105—1150, shows the episodic nature of antitrust for large-firm deconcentration. 
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that each case against a large industrial firm or railroad was accom-
panied by a decline in output of -4.5 percent. 
Whereas the divestiture of a single firm is unlikely to have 
effects this large, it seems more plausible that sporadic antitrust ini-
tiatives, especially attempted divestitures of large firms, raised fears 
of more extended forced restructuring and perhaps other anti-
business initiatives. Shifts in enforcement signaled possible direc-
tions of future antitrust policy. Shifts in antitrust enforcement may 
also have signaled changes in other policies. Tellingly, political initi-
atives to establish a central bank and federal income taxation coin-
cided with attempts to regulate the trusts. If fear of other, related 
policies measures affected business confidence, the statistical results 
would overstate the effects of antitrust but still reflect the influence 
of fluctuating economic policies taken as a whole. 
The view that trust-busting hurt the economy seems specially 
crafted for the United States during these years. Antitrust did not 
loom large in other countries. However, other countries have also 
experienced political struggles between business and other sectors, 
notably labor and agriculture. Arguably, antitrust played the same 
role in America as did socialism in Europe. In less developed coun-
tries, other types of political uncertainty may also play a role. The 
prospect of any one of a variety of government actions may unsettle 
business confidence. I proceed under the assumption that the 
decades-long antitrust controversy in the United States was econom-
ically important either directly or because it served as the flagship 
for a cluster of policies affecting modern forms of business organiza-
tion, and that other, often related political struggles in other coun-
tries may have affected business confidence and output there. 
Business critics of Roosevelt and Taft argued strenuously that 
antitrust hurt business activity. Historians have been skeptical of this 
assertion, and modern economists have little or no knowledge of the 
controversy. While the materials presented here offer belated sup-
port for the critics, the results will understandably fall short of pro-
viding decisive proof. To be sure, the results could be driven by 
reverse causation (when the going gets tough, the trust-busters get 
going), by some third, unknown factor that affects both business 
activity and antitrust filings, or by mere chance. In the end, whether 
the count against Roosevelt and Taft holds up will depend on addi-
tional historical and statistical study, both of the great trust-busting 
era and of other times and places. 
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I. Economic Effects of Controversial Business Forms and Practices 
The effects of antitrust, one could argue, depend on the effects of 
the business forms and practices that antitrust challenges. If antitrust 
challenges monopolies, stricter antitrust enforcement should make 
the economy more efficient since competition promotes efficiency. 
Stricter antitrust should lower prices and increase output. 
The view that turn-of-the-century cartels and merged firms had 
monopoly gain as their primary or major goal runs through a large 
part of the economics and antitrust literature. According to Richard 
Posner, 'The elimination of the formal cartel . . . is an impressive, 
and remains the major, achievement of American antitrust law. 3 
George Stigler saw the formation of large firms and concentrated 
markets as "monopoly and oligopoly by merger.'' 4 
Others have disagreed. Some economists, defending the trusts 
and mergers, emphasize that cooperation can also promote effi-
ciency. For example, the firm itself is a restraint of trade. The mod-
ern theory of the firm observes that unrestricted use of the price 
system will generally not be efficient since the use of the price sys-
tem entails costs as well as benefits. 5 I f competition or the search for 
efficient forms govern structure, the scope of firms, the extent of 
cooperation between firms and the emergence of hybrid forms like 
franchising will be governed by the relative costs. Lewis Haney for-
mulated an early analysis of the costs and benefits of the various 
organizational forms—"trust" types—very much in this spirit.6 
Historical studies of legal and managerial innovations in business 
organization (such as Alfred Chandler's classic, The Visible Hand) 
offer support for the view that the new forms of organization were a 
response to new technologies and that they improved efficiency. 
Modern management structures were created in the rapidly growing 
telegraph and railroad firms, and mergers and consolidation allowed 
the implementation of new management methods. However, Chan-
dler and others also view antitrust—in particular the attacks on car-
tels and the holding company—as hastening or stimulating tighter 
consolidation and hence a more thorough development of modern 
3 Richard A. Posner, Antitrust Law: An Economic Perspective (Chicago, 111., 1976), 39. 
4 George J. Stigler, "Monopoly and Oligopoly by Merger," American Economic Review 
(May 1950). Reprinted in George J. Stigler, The Organization of Industry (Chicago, 111., 
1968). 
5 The idea is due to Ronald Coase, "The Nature of the Firm," Economica n.s. 4 (1937): 
386-405. 
6 Lewis H. Haney, Business Organization and Combination (New York, 1914). 
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centralized management structures. 7 In this view, the economic 
effect of antitrust will depend on the type of case filed. Stepped up 
enforcement would have pushed corporations toward their modern 
form only if the law offered clear legal havens for large, coordinated 
enterprises. Attacks on consolidated enterprises, for example, would 
have undermined, rather than promoted, the search for new organi-
zational structures. 
Work by Lester Telser supports Chandler's view. Telser regards 
mergers as a way of transferring information between business units, 
allowing low-cost methods to be transferred to previously indepen-
dent high-cost firms. He also finds that turn-of-the-century merger 
intensity is positively correlated with industry growth, where high 
growth rates presumably reflect more rapidly changing technology 
and markets. Michael Gort provides similar but more extensive 
results with more recent data. Industry merger activity is positively 
correlated with industry growth, the fraction of technical personnel, 
and productivity increases. 8 
Other research by economists has reevaluated the economic 
arguments for and against various "restraints of trade." For example, 
many of the early antitrust cases involved vertical restrictions such as 
exclusive dealing, leasing, tying clauses, and fixed retail prices. At 
one time economists rejected such restrictions as monopolistic.9 
Aaron Director, Robert Bork, Ward Bowman, Lester Telser and 
others developed plausible, economically consistent rationales that 
did not place the pursuit of monopoly at center stage. 1 0 While a new 
generation of theoretical economists has advanced monopoly expla-
nations for some practices, the blanket condemnation that was com-
mon earlier seems unjustified on theoretical or empirical grounds. 
In short, economists and business historians have shifted the 
debate on the modern corporation away from monopoly and toward 
organizational issues. A firm's internal organization, and not just 
' Chandler, 'The Development of Modern Management Structures;" Hannah, The 
Rise of the Corporate Economy; and Freyer, 'The Sherman Antitrust Act." 
8 Lester G. Telser, A Theory of Efficient Cooperation and Competition (Cambridge, 
U.K., 1987); and Michael Gort, "An Economic Disturbance Theory of Mergers," Quar-
terly journal of Economics 83 (November 1969): 624-642. 
9 For example, the following faculty members at the University of Chicago signed a 
letter in 1952 urging repeal of the fair-trade laws: Ward Bowman, Milton Friedman, H. 
G. Lewis, L. A. Metzler, Margaret Reid and T. W. Schultz. Listed in Thomas R. Over-
street Jr., Resale Price Maintenance: Economic Theories and Empirical Evidence (Wash-
ington, D.C. 1983), 8. 
1 0 These developments are summarized by Robert H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox: A 
Policy at War with Itself (New York, 1978); and Posner, Antitrust Law. 
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anonymous market mechanisms, can perform a useful coordinating 
function; and merger and vertical restrictions between firms can be 
interpreted as an attempt to have one's cake and eat it too, that is, to 
have the advantages of both market and firm forms of organization. 
Even cartels, which modem mainstream economists have typically 
condemned, found defenders among prominent turn-of-the-century 
economists and lawyers. Modern theoretical work has revived this 
defense, as have interpretations of the historical role of cartels in subse-
quent organizational forms like the holding company and tight merger. 
With fixed costs and fluctuating demand, a competitive equilibrium may 
not exist. This sounds like a technical oddity, but it rests on a simple 
change in the usual model of competition. Instead of assuming that there 
are "many" firms in the market, suppose that there are only a few firms. 
For given market conditions, all firms in an industry will not be able to 
operate at minimum average cost. The situation is a type of natural 
monopoly involving not one firm, but several firms. 
The fixed-cost problem provides a justification for certain common 
types of cartel agreements, merger and vertical restrictions.11 It also 
closes an obvious gap in modern economists' theoretical machinery—the 
case of fixed costs and few firms. Expositors of "cutthroat competition" or 
"spoiling the market" included Alfred Marshall, Irving Fisher and J. M. 
Clark. The notion that cartels may promote efficiency is also supported by 
two recent studies of ocean shipping, where cartels have persisted for 150 
years despite easy entry.1 2 
1 1 The idea of a competitive equilibrium is made precise by the theory of the "core." 
Economic applications of core theory to a variety of circumstances, including industries 
with fixed costs, were pioneered by Lester G. Telser, Competition, Collusion and Game 
Theory (Chicago, 111., 1972); and Lester G. Telser, Economic Theory and the Core (Chi-
cago, 111., 1978). William W. Sharkey, The Theory of Natural Monopoly (Cambridge, U.K., 
1982), contains a less theoretical treatment. Lester G. Telser, "Genesis of the Sherman 
Act," in Research in Finance, ed. Robert G. Lanzilotti and Yoram C. Peles (Greenwich, 
Conn., 1984), and Telser, A Theory of Efficient Cooperation, discuss developments at the 
turn of the century in light of this theory. George Bittlingmayer, "Decreasing Average 
Cost and Competition: A New Look at the Addyston Pipe Case," Journal of Law and 
Economics 25 (October 1982): 201-299; and George Bittlingmayer, "Did Antitrust Poli-
cies Cause the Great Merger Wave?" Journal of Law and Economics 28 (April 1985): 
77-118, covers various aspects of the economic issues and provides an application to the 
cartel in Addyston and to the Great Merger Wave. George Bittlingmayer, "The Economic 
Problem of Fixed Costs and What Legal Research Can Contribute," Law and Social 
Inquiry 14 (Fall 1989): 739-762, discusses economic and policy implications, with partic-
ular reference to the common law of restraints of trade and the judicial interpretation of 
antitrust law over time. 
1 2 See William Sjostrom, "Collusion in Ocean Shipping: A Test of Monopoly and 
Empty Core Models'," Journal of Political Economy 97 (October 1989): 1160-1179, and 
Stephen Craig Pirrong, "An Application of the Theory of the Core to the Study of Ocean 
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Business historians also regard many tum-of-the-century cartels as 
originating in over-capacity but view the cartels in many industries as 
transitional forms that laid the groundwork for future efficiencies. For 
example, legal challenges and the complexity of coordination led railroads 
to "communities of interest" or interlocking directorates. Similar prob-
lems led manufacturing firms to seek merger, first on a small scale in die 
late 1880s, and then on a larger scale in the 1890s. Consolidation allowed 
more efficient regulation of plant closing than cartels and also laid the 
basis for vertical integration.13 While some of the peripheral consolida-
tions merely sought legal refuge from the prohibition against cartels, the 
center firms developed new centralized management structures and inte-
grated production over several stages. 
This excursion into die origins and nature of the trusts and the cor-
poration deserves a summary. The Sherman Act and other antitrust laws 
have prohibited a variety of practices at one time or another as 
"monopolistic." However, there are plausible efficiency alternatives to the 
monopoly story. These alternatives have a basis in economic theory and 
in actual business experience. Alternative explanations certainly exist for 
mergers, the large integrated firm, and various "vertical" practices such as 
territorial restraints on dealers, resale price maintenance, tying, and fran-
chise restrictions. Even some cartel arrangements, uniformly condemned 
by American law, have an efficiency explanation. While some mergers, 
some vertical restrictions and some cartels may be monopolistic, there is 
no major class of restrictions or practices that does not have an efficiency 
rationale. 
I I . Economic Consequences of Politics and Policy Uncertainty 
Antitrust in practice amounts to more than a simple undoing of the 
effects that an outside observer might attribute to the business practices 
that have come under attack. In particular, antitrust may have other 
Shipping Markets/' Journal of Law and Economics 35 (April 1992): 89-131. Herbert 
Hovenkamp, "The Sherman Act and the Classical Theory of Competition," Iowa Law 
Review 74 (July 1989): 1019-1065, takes up the apparent simultaneous abandonment by 
the law of defenses for cartels and the adoption by economists of the neoclassical compet-
itive model. He argues that thinking on the Sherman act was influenced by prevailing 
"economic ideology." It seems possible, however, that economists' views also adapt to 
prevailing ideology, or less charitably, to politics. 
1 3 Chandler, The Visible Hand, 137-143 and 315-336; and Thomas K. McCraw, 
"Rethinking the Trust Question," in Regulation in Perspective, ed. Thomas K. McCraw 
(Boston, Mass., 1981), 12-15. 
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effects for three reasons. First, antitrust authorities and judges make mis-
takes. Second, antitrust enforcement is influenced by politics. Finally, 
controversy and new initiatives result in uncertainty that generate incen-
tives for firms to wait with major undertakings until that uncertainty is 
resolved. 
Since economists and business historians have not reached a 
consensus about the ultimate effects of various business practices, it 
seems likely that well-intentioned prosecutors and judges faced some 
difficulty in distinguishing good from bad business practices. I f some 
vertical restrictions foster inefficiency but others promote competi-
tion between brands, if some business practices restrict the ability of 
rivals to compete but others protect productive investments, if some 
cartels have simple monopoly gain as their goal but others solve the 
fixed cost problem, then government and judges are likely to make 
mistakes. This is the first source of inefficiency in antitrust enforce-
ment. 
Antitrust in practice involves more than mistakes. It also involves 
politics. Relatively recent examples in which politics appears to have 
played a role include the initiative to break up the oil companies in 
the 1970s, proposals to file cases against Japanese companies for 
their practices in Japan, the 1969 suit against the auto companies for 
allegedly conspiring to suppress innovations in smog control, the ill-
starred thirteen-year suit against IBM filed in the last days of the 
Johnson Administration by Ramsey Clark, and the trust-busting of 
Thurman Arnold in the late 1930s. Perhaps more importantly, the 
antitrust authorities' periodic revivals of large-firm deconcentration 
and monopolization initiatives arguably have been directed against 
the winners and promoted politically by the losers of Schumpeterian 
competition. Illustrative instances include the cases against Standard 
Oil at the turn of the century and against Microsoft in the 1990s. 
Unfortunately, the politics of antitrust have been largely ignored. 
Fred McChesney argues that while a good deal of analysis of anti-
trust, including "Chicago School" antitrust, takes a "public interest" 
perspective, an economically consistent approach should be based on 
the "public choice" of antitrust. 1 4 Thomas McCraw's observation 
concerning the "over-capacity problem 7' or in terms set out above, 
the "fixed-cost problem," suggests that the struggle over antitrust 
was as redistributive as any other political debate. The over-capacity 
problem "underlay nearly every major economic issue of the period: 
1 4 Fred S. McChesney, "Be True to Your School: Contrasting Chicago Approaches to 
Antitrust and Regulation," Cato Journal 10 (Winter 1991): 775-798. 
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not only the trust question, but also the perennial divisive battles 
over the protective tariff, the railroad rate problem, and the imperial 
quest for foreign markets to absorb surplus production/' 1 5 
Finally, shifts in policy, whether purely efficiency-motivated or 
reflecting redistributive struggles, generate uncertainty. As a result, 
firms have an incentive to wait before investing. The relevant choice 
is no longer investing or not investing, but rather investing now or 
waiting until the uncertainty resolves itself. Surprisingly, economists 
have only recently addressed in a systematic way the effects of 
uncertainty, in particular political uncertainty, on investment and 
economic activity. As observed by Robert S. Pindyck, who recently 
surveyed this emerging literature: "A major cost of political and eco-
nomic instability may be its depressing effect on investment." The 
effects of uncertainty may explain why actual investment does not 
appear to be influenced very much by the "cost of capital" variables 
such as interest rates, the tax treatment of investment or the relative 
price of capital goods. 1 6 
Though the theoretical work is new, early economists held sim-
ilar views, and mentioned the trust issue by name. Wesley Clair 
Mitchell, the founder of modern business cycle research, cited 
uncertainty over the legal status of large firms to explain the 1911 
recession. Irving Fisher attributed the 1920s expansion to restrained 
antitrust enforcement, especially against mergers. Kenneth Roose's 
study of the Great Depression and Friedman and Schwartz' Mone-
tary History of the United States mention New Deal economic poli-
cies, including reversals on antitrust, as factors that slowed 
recovery. 1 7 This line of economic thought is also consistent with the 
repeated requests by business during the Progressive Era for new 
legislation and regulatory bodies that would "restore certainty" to 
the administration of antitrust. 
For a number of reasons, then, the primary influence of antitrust 
policy, in particular shifting and unstable antitrust, is likely to be 
through investment. The defense of cartels and merger outlined 
1 5 McCraw, "Rethinking the Trust Question," 6. 
1 6 Robert S. Pindyck, "Irreversibility, Uncertainty, and Investment," Journal of Eco-
nomic Literature 29 (September 1991): 1141. Avinash K. Dixit and Robert S. Pindyck, 
Investment under Uncertainty (Princeton, N.J., 1994) survey the literature on uncertainty 
and investment. 
1 7 Wesley Clair Mitchell, Business Cycles (Berkeley, Calif., 1913) 85; Irving Fisher, 
The Stock Market Crash—And After (New York, 1930), 101, 106 and 110; Kenneth Roose, 
The Economics of Recession and Revival: An Interpretation of 1937-38 (New Haven, 
Conn., 1954), chap. 4; and Milton Friedman and Anna J. Schwartz, A Monetary History 
of the United States, 1867-1960 (Princeton, N.J., 1963), 495-496. 
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"Roped!" • According to one view, Roosevelt's groundwork from the Republican side 
and Bryan's pressure from the Democratic side had "roped," though not yet tamed, the 
"predatory wealth" of the trusts. (This illustration originally appeared in the Spokane 
Spokesman-Review, and is reproduced from Albert Shaw, A Cartoon History of Roosevelt's 
Career (New York, 1910).) 
above points to their function in allowing firms to recover fixed costs. 
Consequently, legal initiatives that put that recovery in danger will 
affect investment in capital. This explanation also nicely comple-
ments the effects of pure policy uncertainty. 1 8 Legal attacks on 
merged firms also raise the possibility of divestiture, that is, an argu-
ably less efficient and possibly unpredictable rearrangement of 
assets. Hence, the threat of divestiture is also likely to affect invest-
ment by firms under attack or likely to be attacked. Finally, antitrust 
initiatives reflect a political equilibrium and may act as a signal or 
proxy that other attacks on business and investors are imminent, 
where these attacks would also lower the expected return on invest-
1 8 Avinash K. Dixit, "Investment and Hysteresis," Journal of Economic Perspectives 6 
(Winter 1992): 123, makes the argument that Japanese firms "are protected from the 
downside risk because the government supports them in various ways, including carteliza-
tion to avoid destructive competition in recessions. Then the value of waiting to invest, 
which is governed mainly by the downside risk, is quite small, and they invest more 
aggressively." 
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ment. For example, the federal corporate and personal income taxes 
were passed during Wilson's first term. 
While the primary mechanism linking antitrust and economic 
activity runs through investment, other measures of activity are likely 
to be affected. Consumer purchases of durables depend on the busi-
ness cycle and may also be influenced by economic uncertainty.1 9 In 
addition, many expenditures typically not treated as investment by 
accountants or in official statistics, such as labor and maintenance, 
have an investment component. 
I I I . Measuring Policy with Case Filings 
Actual and expected antitrust policy does not have a single dimen-
sion. Antitrust cases have been filed against cartels, mergers, single-
firm business practices, large national and international firms, 
railroads and small proprietorships. There is also no single yardstick 
for the severity of expected enforcement. Businesses and investors 
will attempt to infer expected enforcement by looking at current 
case filings, presidential statements, congressional initiatives and 
court decisions. 
In the statistical work below, I use filings of federal antitrust cases, 
sorted into two classes, major and minor, depending on whether one or 
more of the defendants appears on David Bunting's list of large industri-
als or railroads. This section discusses the choice of this variable. 
From a strictly legal point of view, case filings are irrelevant 
because cases have to be litigated and won: the ultimate effect 
depends on what the courts say, in particular the Supreme Court. At 
a practical level, however, filings are important because prosecutors 
will prefer to file cases they think they can win. More importantly, 
courts are influenced by popular opinion and political pressure. 
Faced with case filings that reflect a political sentiment, courts may 
compromise legal principle, knowing that if they do not, the political 
pressure that generates the suits in the first place will be translated 
into legislation that overrides the courts. 2 0 Case filings reflect politi-
1 9 Christine Romer, "The Great Crash and the Onset of the Great Depression," 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 105 (August 1990): 597-624, makes this argument for the 
effects of the 1929 crash. 
2 0 Some judges explicitly recognized the courts' susceptibility to political influence. In 
his famous dissent in Northern Securities, Holmes accused the majority of pandering to 
political pressure: "Great cases, like hard cases, make bad law. For great cases are called 
great, not by reason of their real importance in shaping the law of the future, but because 
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of some accident of immediate overwhelming interest which appeals to the feelings and 
distorts the judgment." Northern Securities, 193 U.S. 197 (1904). 
cal reality. In addition, the filing of a case by the federal government 
is important because antitrust offers great latitude to prosecutorial 
discretion. Finally, the government may file cases with no intention 
of winning, but merely for their nuisance or short-run political value. 
Cases often outlive the administrations that file them. 
The history of antitrust shows that courts often yield on an issue or 
run the risk of being overruled. The Supreme Court's enunciation of a 
"rule of reason" in Standard Oil and American Tobacco in 1911, for 
example, provoked Congress into passing the Clayton and Federal Trade 
Commission Acts, which spelled out in greater detail which mergers and 
which practices it wanted outlawed. Also in 1911, the Supreme Court 
stumbled onto the prohibition of resale price maintenance in Dr. Miles. 
However, it has been loathe to reverse itself, regardless of the scholarly 
debate, leaving that for Congress. In fact, Congress did exacdy that by 
first passing and then repealing the Miller-Tydings Act, which allowed 
states to pass so-called fair trade laws. 
Clearly, a number of factors influenced the number and types of 
cases filed in the first twenty-five years of the Sherman Act and offered 
signals about future policy. The courts adopted and then barely rejected 
the view that mergers do not fall under the Sherman Act; Congress cre-
ated two new antitrust agencies—the Antitrust Division and the Bureau 
of Corporations; Presidents Roosevelt and Taft addressed the trust issue 
frequently and forcefully; and the Courts ordered the divestiture of Stan-
dard Oil and the Tobacco Trust but did so in a way that led to the anti-
trust reforms of 1914. But in the end, the ultimate instrument of policy 
remained the federal lawsuit itself. 
IV. Antitrust Enforcement and the Economy 
This section recounts the history of antitrust enforcement and general 
economic developments from 1890 through 1914. The aim is to provide 
important background. Do antitrust case filings, especially against major 
firms, reflect other, harder-to-measure aspects of policy? Was the anti-
trust issue important, politically and economically? What did contempo-
raries say about the effects of antitrust on business conditions? 
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Table 1 
Federal Antitrust Cases Filed, Millions of Dollars of Assets or Invested 
Capital of Defendants in Brackets, 1890-1914 
Total Major Major Majo 
Cases Industrial Railroad Cases T 
1890 1 0 0 0 
1891 0 0 0 0 
1892 5 2 1 3 
[130] 18 RRs 
1893 1 0 0 0 
1894 4 0 0 0 
1895 1 0 0 0 
1896 3 1 1 2 
[33] 32 RRs 
1897 2 0 0 0 
1898 0 0 0 0 
1899 1 0 0 0 
1900 0 0 0 0 
1901 0 0 0 0 
1902 3 1 1 2 
[90] [350] 
1903 2 0 0 0 
1904 1 0 0 0 
1905 5 1 1 2 
[70] [433] 
1906 14 3 0 3 
[647] 
1907 9 2 2 4 
[345] [692] 
1908 7 0 2 2 
[570] 
1909 3 1 0 1 
[124] 
1910 15 3 1 4 
[276] [309] 
1911 23 3 0 3 
[1889] 
1912 19 2 0 2 
[295] 
1913 24 5 2 7 
[312] [797] 
1914 11 0 4 4 
[531] 
Total 154 24 15 39 
Case Name or Major 
Defendant in Major Cases 
Trans-Missouri, American Sugar 
Refining, Distilling & Cattle 
Joint Traffic, Addyston (U.S. Cast 
Iron Pipe & Foundry) 
Northern Securities, Swift (also 
Armour) 
Armour, Terminal Railroad Assn. 
Virginia-Carolina Chem., Ameri-
can 
Ice, Standard Oil 
Reading, American Tobacco, 
Du Pont, Union Pacific 
Union Pacific, NYNH & Hartford 
RR 
American Sugar Refining 
Cudahy, Missouri-Pacific, Swift, 
American Sugar 
General Electric, U.S. Steel, 
United Shoe 
International Harvester, Aluminum 
Company of America 
United Shoe, Corn Products, 
Kodak, AT&T, American Can, Ter 
minal RR Assn., Reading. RR 
S. Pacific, Lehigh Valley, NYNH & 
Hartford, Rockefeller (NYNH & 
Hartford) 
Note: Case filings are from Commerce Clearing House, The Federal Antitrust Laws with Sum-
mary of Cases Instituted, by the United States, 1890-1951 (Chicago, 1952). Major cases are those 
involving firms that ranked, in the year of the case filing, among the top 100 industrials or top 
25 railroads, as measured by assets or invested capital. (The Addyston defendants are classified 
according to the 1899 rank of the merged successor corporation, which involves an overstate-
ment of their size since firms in addition to the original defendants were merged.) This classifi-
cation relies on the lists of large corporations in David Bunting, The Rise of Large American 
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Figure 1 • Six-month Moving Sum of Antitrust Case Filings Against Major Firms and 
Natural Log of Production Index, June 1891-December 1914. 
Notes: The production index comes from Moore, Business Cycle Indicators; the antitrust cases 
against major firms were compiled from Commerce Clearing House, The Federal Antitrust 
Laws; and the size class of firms were taken from Bunting, The Rise of Large American Corpo-
rations. 
Corporations, 1889-1919 (New York, 1987), Appendices D and E. The case against a major util-
ity, American Telephone & Telegraph (filed July 1913), is also included. Asset values of AT&T, 
and the second 1914 case involving the NYNH & Hartford Railroad are not included. Emory R. 
Johnson, American Railway Transportation (New York, 1909), 245-246, has information on the 
Trans-Missouri and Joint Traffic agreements. 
To aid this discussion, Table 1 summarizes the enforcement record 
by year and lists the cases filed against major firms, Table 2 lists the ten 
largest industrial firms in 1911, their assets and antitrust cases filed 
against diem, and Figure 1 shows the natural log of monthly aggregate 
production, and a six-month moving sum of die number of cases filed 
against major firms. 
The Sherman Antitrust Act signed into law by President Benjamin 
Harrison on 2 July, 1890 prohibits "every contract, combination, in die 
form of a trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or 
commerce." It also prohibits "monopolization/' The language came from 
die common law, but its implications were unclear. In fact, the courts 
later explicidy rejected common law precedents in Trans-Missouri and in 
Taft's Addyston opinion.21 
2 1 Hovenkamp, "The Sherman Act," and Mark F. Grady, "Toward a Positive Theory 
of Antitrust," Economic Inquiry 30 (April 1992): 225-241. Thomas Hazlett, "The Legisla-
tive History of the Sherman Act Re-examined/' Economic Inquiry 30 (April 1992): 263-
276, argues that the Sherman Act was passed to deflect attention from the McKinley 
Tariff. 
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Table 2 
Ten Largest Industrial Firms in 1911, Firm Assets, Year of Federal 
Antitrust Case Filing and Divestitures Sought 
Asset Rank and Firm Name Assets Year of Case, 
(millions) Divestitures 
1. U.S. Steel $1,739 1911 Divestiture 
2. Standard Oil 860 1906 Divestiture 
3. American Tobacco 283 1907 Divestiture 
4. International Harvester 224 1912 Divestiture 
5. Anaconda Copper 189 — 
6. American Smelting & Refining 186 — 
7. Armour & Co. 140 1902, 1910° 
8. Swift & Co. 134 1902, 1910° 
9. Pullman Co. 129 — 
10. American Sugar Refining 128 1892, 1909, 1910 
Divestiture 0 0 
Total Assets of Defendants $3,508 
Total Assets, All Manufacturing 0 0 0 $16,937 
° Two cases, one criminal. 
0 0 All three cases. 
0 0 0 For 1892 and 1909. 
Notes: Asset values are from Bunting, The Rise of Large American Corporations, Appendix D; 
and U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the United 
States, Colonial Times to the 1970 (Washington, D.C., 1975), Series P123, 684. 
Members of a coal cartel served as the first defendants in a Sherman 
Act suit. The case, Jellico Mountain Coal ir Coke, was filed in October of 
1890. The government was able to claim victory by the following June. It 
filed three major cases in early 1892: Trans-Missouri, against a major rail-
road agreement; £. C. Knight, against the reviled Sugar Trust (newly 
incorporated under the New Jersey Holding Company Act); and Green-
hut, against the Distilling and Cattle Feeding Trust. 2 2 All three cases 
wound their way through the courts over the next few years. The Trans-
Missouri agreement was held in 1897 by a divided Supreme Court to be 
in violation of the Sherman Act. The Sugar and Whiskey trusts were 
eventually cleared on the ground that single firms with large market 
share, even if achieved through merger, were beyond the law's reach. 
These three cases against major trusts were followed by a string of cases 
against labor in 1893 and 1894, a local coal cartel in 1895, and coal dis-
2 2 Even before these cases were decided, William W. Cook, The Corporation Problem 
(New York, 1893), 243, recognized where the Sherman Act would lead: "The law has 
decided that the trust mode of organizing a monopoly is illegal. Hence it is that the num-
berless trusts are hastening to adopt the other mode of organization—the corporation, the 
plan of the Diamond Match monopoly. Already the Sugar Trust and the American Cotton 
Oil Trust have dissolved and become New Jersey Corporations, and other trusts are fol-
lowing the example." 
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tributors and the Kansas City Livestock exchange in 1896 and 1897. Two 
new major initiatives were filed in 1896, however. The agreement at issue 
in the January 1896 filing in Joint Traffic involved 32 major railroads and 
an agreement crafted to satisfy the requirements of the Sherman Act, and 
the December 1896 Addyston Pipe filing represented the first case filed 
against a major industrial cartel. Major cartel cases had previously 
involved railroads. 
Arguably, the trust and free silver issues dominated economic 
policy discussions of the 1890s. Most analysis of the business-cycle 
for this period has focused on the gold standard and free silver, see-
ing them as causes of the Panic of 1893 and the recession of 1896. 
However, Figure 1 shows that output declined in 1892, that is with 
the filing of the cases against the Trans-Missouri Association and the 
Sugar and the Distilling and Cattle Feeding Trusts. The last two 
involved the legality of the holding company. The timing suggests 
that the decision to file cases against major trusts may have led to the 
initial decline in 1892. Similarly, the 1896 Joint Traffic and Addys-
ton cartel filings offer one reason for the severity of the 1896 
slump. 2 3 
The key to much of what follows is the 1895 Knight decision, 
which held that merger was per se legal. Knight explains the subse-
quent merger wave, and it illuminates the significance of Roosevelt's 
trust-busting. Circumstantial and other evidence strongly favors the 
view that Knight encouraged merger. The Addyston defendants 
merged shortly after they lost their case in the Court of Appeals in 
1898 . 2 4 The Standard Oil company, which had been attacked as a 
trust, adopted the holding company form in 1899 . 2 5 Other firms that 
merged or re-organized include U.S. Steel, Republic Steel, Interna-
tional Harvester, American Tobacco and International Paper. 
Approximately 50 percent of United States manufacturing capacity 
was involved, and many merged firms achieved market shares in 
excess of 50 percent. 2 6 
McKinley's attorney general, John W. Griggs, never failed to cite 
2 3 Mitchell, Business Cycles, 51, emphasizes uncertainty about the gold standard in 
1893 and cites a number of contemporaries, including Taussig and Carnegie. Friedman 
and Schwartz, A Monetary History, chap. 3, also discuss this period, as well as the 1896 
free silver debate. 
2 4 George Bittlingmayer, "Price Fixing and the Addyston Pipe Case," in Research in 
Law and Economics 5, ed. Richard O. Zerbe, (1983), discusses the case in detail. 
2 5 Haney, Business Organization and Combination, 215. 
2 6 See Ralph L. Nelson, Merger Movements in American Industry, 1895-1956 (Princ-
eton, N.J., 1959), App. C, 154-162. Bittlingmayer, "Did Antitrust Policies Cause the Great 
Merger Wave?" sifts through the arguments and data. 
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"To trap the mouse, don't raze the house." • Roosevelt as Samson bringing down 
more than a "malefactor of great wealth." Illustration is reproduced from George E. 
Mowry, The Era of Theodore Roosevelt (New York, 195S), 221. 
Knight as the reason for not moving against the merger wave that 
picked up steam in the late 1890s. "As a matter of fact all the com-
panies which you refer to as now organizing for the purpose o f 
securing complete or partial monopoly of different branches of man-
ufacture, are similar to the sugar combination and are not within the 
jurisdiction of the federal courts/'2 7 From December 1897 until 
March 1902, the Department of Justice filed only one case. 2 8 Hans 
Thorelli calls this period the "low watermark" of antitrust. 2 9 This was 
also a time of rapid economic growth. Figure 1 shows that between 
2 < Griggs in March of 1899. Quoted in William Letwin, Law and Public Policy in 
America: The Evolution of the Sherman Antitrust Act (New York, 1965), 140. 
2 8 U.S. v. Chesapeake & Ohio Fuel, 115 Fed. 610 (1902), filed 8 May 1899. 
2 9 Thorelli, The Federal Antitrust Policy, 405. 
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1897 and 1902 real output quickly moved above the long-term trend. 
That growth was interrupted only by the recession of the second half 
of 1900. Friedman and Schwartz point to three factors in the expan-
sion: the demise of agitation for free silver, the expansion of world 
gold supplies, and strong agricultural output at home coupled with 
poor harvests in Europe, which accelerated the flow of gold into the 
United States. 3 0 However, the Supreme Court's favorable treatment 
of merger, the government's unwillingness to challenge the extraor-
dinary merger wave of the late 1890s, and the virtual suspension of 
cartel case filings may also have made investment in productive 
assets more attractive. 
After McKinley's September 1901 assassination, Theodore Roosevelt 
became president. This event changed antitrust history. Roosevelt's anti-
trust views were well known from his time as governor of New York. 
Financial markets tumbled after McKinley was shot, and again when he 
died. 3 1 After some waffling, Roosevelt filed two cases, Northern Securities 
and Swift in March and May 1902. The aim in the first case was to 
reverse the Knight holding diat merger was per se legal, and Roosevelt 
later took pride diat he succeeded.32 The defendants in both cases were 
the bane of midwest farmers—the large midwest railroads and the Chi-
cago meat packers.3 3 
There can be no doubt that die trust issue was politically important. 
The Expediting Act of 1903, immediately applied to Northern Securities, 
allowed die attorney general to declare an antitrust case of "general pub-
lic importance," which meant that it would be heard by a panel of diree 
circuit judges, whose decision could be appealed only to the U.S. 
3 0 Friedman and Schwartz, A Monetary History, 139-141. The worldwide growth in 
the stock of gold no doubt had a favorable effect, but the sluggish growth of per capita 
income in the U.K. over the same period suggests that real factors such as the antitrust 
climate may have influenced real growth either directly, or indirectly through the alloca-
tion of gold supplies across countries. 
3 1 The reaction of the financial markets is covered in Henry F. Pringle, Theodore 
Roosevelt: A Biography (New York, 1931), 237-238 and 244-246; William Henry Har-
baugh, Power and Responsibility: The Life and Times of Theodore Roosevelt (New York, 
1961); Letwin, Law and Public Policy, 196; and Thorelli, The Federal Antitrust Policy, 
417. In contrast, Kennedy's 22 November 1963 assassination was marked by a decline that 
day, but recovery above previous levels when trading resumed. 
3 2 Pringle, Roosevelt, 253 and 264. 
3 3 Gary D. Libecap, 'The Rise of the Chicago Packers and the Origins of Meat Inspec-
tion and Antitrust," Economic Inquiry 30 (April 1992): 242-262; and Donald J. Boudreaux 
and Thomas J . DiLorenzo, "Antitrust before the Sherman Act," in The Causes and Con-
sequences of Antitrust: A Public-Choice Perspective, ed. Fred S. McChesney and William 
F. Shughart II (Chicago, 111., 1995) analyze the rise of the Chicago packers and the polit-
ical fallout. 
George Bittlingmayer I 382 
Supreme Court. On the stump in the summer of 1903, Roosevelt men-
tioned the trust issue in every speech and devoted several talks alone to 
that issue.34 The revival of antitrust was also accompanied by an economic 
and financial slump, the "Rich Man's Panic" of 1903. a 5 After the district 
court declared the Northern Securities agreement illegal in April of 1903, 
the stock market dropped by 10 percent over the next three months.36 
The Supreme Court upheld the district court in March 1904, in a 5-4 
decision. 
Interestingly, in light of the stock market declines and the upcoming 
election, Roosevelt did not file any more major cases, despite the favor-
able district and Supreme Court nilings. His attorney general said imme-
diately following the Supreme Court decision that there would be no 
"ninning amok" on the trust question. 
Once the 1904 election was safely out of the way, however, 
Roosevelt's trust-busting again came to life. The cases filed over the next 
two years were directed for the most part at local associations of grocers, 
ice plants, lumber dealers and meat wholesalers. Three cases involving 
associations and selling organizations were national in scope, involving 
retail druggists, producers of licorice paste, and paper manufacturers. 
Two suits involved large firms. The government sued the Chicago 
meat packers in July of 1905 and the Terminal Railroad Association of St. 
Louis in December. The other major change was the establishment of 
the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice, which was given its 
first appropriation in 1904. 
Roosevelt's biggest case, and the biggest antitrust case to that point, 
was filed against Rockefeller's Standard Oil in November of 1906. It was 
the second largest industrial firm at the time. Disgruntled petroleum 
industry interests had been urging the federal government to sue Stan-
dard Oil since the Sherman Act was first passed.3 7 Under Roosevelt, 
pressure increased. No less than fourteen state suits were filed against 
Standard Oil in the year and a half prior to the November 1906 federal 
filing.38 
3 4 Thorelli, The Federal Antitrust Policy, 430. 
3 5 The Wall Street Journal, 12 August 1903, p. 1, discussed the charges, but dismissed 
them. 
3 6 Stock data here and below are from Alfred Cowles 3rd andAssociates, Common-
Stock Indexes (Bloomington, Ind., 1939). 
3 7 Bruce Bringhurst, Antitrust and the Oil Monopoly: The Standard Oil Cases, 1890-
1911 (Westport, Conn., 1979), chap. 5, chronicles the unsuccessful efforts of the oil 
industry interests and others to have the federal government bring charges against Stan-
dard. 
3 8 Ralph W. Hidy and Muriel E. Hidy, Pioneering in Big Business, 1882-1911: History 
of the Standard Oil Company (New Jersey) (New York, 1955), Table 52, 683. 
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One source of this political pressure may very well have been the 
falling price of crude as new Oklahoma and Texas oil fields entered 
production. 3 9 The production of crude increased from 64 million 
barrels in 1900 to 135 million barrels in 1905. Prices fell from $1.19 
per barrel to 62 cents, which represented a real price decline of 55 
percent. 4 0 
Public opinion was reflected and intensified by Ida TarbelTs History 
of Standard Oil, which appeared in installments starting in 1902 and then 
as a book in 1904. Congress directed die Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion to investigate Standard's relations with the railroads. An investigation 
of Standard by the newly formed Bureau of Corporations in May of 1906 
concluded that Standard had used unfair methods, including secret rad-
road rebates, to gain advantages over its competitors. Following the filing 
of die federal antitrust suit, the ICC issued the results of its investigation 
in January of 1907, and concluded that Standard had accepted secret 
railroad rebates, violated the Hepburn Act (regulating railroad rates) and 
practiced unfair local price cutting, among other transgressions. A second, 
equally unfavorable report of the Bureau of Corporations was issued in 
May. Standard lost state suits in Missouri and Texas in May and June. It 
was fined $29 million on August 3 for violating die Elkins Act, and the 
Bureau of Corporations issued a new report on August 5 castigating Stan-
dard. 4 1 
The legal wrangling on the Sherman Act suit began in early 1907 
with die question of whether the St. Louis circuit court, which had 
handed down the unfavorable ruling against the Northern Securities 
merger, was die correct venue for the case. Standard attorneys argued 
diat the suit had to be filed where Jersey Standard, the principle defen-
dant, resided. Roosevelt's attorney general placed the case under the 
Expediting Act of 1903, and the St. Louis court quickly ruled against 
Standard, arguing that it was sufficient that one of the defendants, the 
Waters-Pierce Oil Company, was a Missouri resident. Despite the 
increased resources of the government, the investigation went slowly. 
This was due in part to the procedural restrictions inherent in a civil suit. 
The government seriously considered bringing criminal charges to speed 
things up. Standard Oil attempted to prevent the filing of criminal 
3 9 Hidy and Hidy, Pioneering in Big Business, chap. 23. 
4 0 U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the 
United States: Colonial Times to the Present (Washington, D.C., 1975), Series M138-
M139. 
4 1 This fine was overturned in July of 1908. Bringhurst, Antitrust and the Oil Monop-
oly, 139. 
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"Vaccinating the Trusts. Give the doctor time; his patient has a lot of arms that 
need attention/7 • Roosevelt's second antitrust case was directed at another trust unpop-
ular in the midwest, the Chicago meat packers. (This illustration originally appeared in the 
Minneapolis Journal, and is reproduced from Albert Shaw, A Cartoon History of 
Roosevelt's Career (New York, 1910).) 
charges by offering to settle the suit instead, but the government's attor-
neys refused. Testimony was taken in September. 
The stock market declined by 12.5 percent from January to July, and 
another 22 percent from July through November. A number of bank fail-
ures occurred. The troubled economic conditions were widely associated 
with die antitrust case. 4 2 Filings in July against two other major industrial 
4 2 Pringle, Roosevelt, 434; and George E. Mowry, The Era of Theodore Roosevelt (New 
York, 1958), 219-220. 
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firms, American Tobacco and E. I. du Pont, probably contributed to the 
perception diat Roosevelt's use of antitrust was serious. 
Roosevelt adopted a two-pronged response to the charge that his 
trust policy was responsible for die Panic. Publicly, he went on the attack, 
claiming in an August 1907 speech diat not he, but rather "certain male-
factors of great wealth" had provoked die panic "in order to discredit die 
policy of die government." In early 1908, he blamed die stock decline on 
the "speculative folly and flagrant dishonesty of a few great men of 
wealdi," and he vowed to seek federal supervision of corporations.43 He 
also carried on an extensive correspondence, deflecting requests to 
change his policies. 4 4 The request by New York bankers for a publicly 
announced temporary suspension of die case was rebuffed. But behind 
die scenes, Roosevelt was ready to compromise in die face of die disas-
trous economic developments. The Antitrust Division agreed to a one-
mondi postponement of die Standard case in December. During die first 
part of 1908, negotiations were entered into with die aim of settling the 
case. In die end no agreement was reached. 
In another retreat from his trust-busting stance, Roosevelt also 
expressed willingness to modify die Sherman Act. The Civic Federation, 
in consultation widi the president and the Commissioner of Corporations 
drew up a statute that would allow "reasonable" restraints of trade 4 5 It 
was introduced by Congressman Hepburn in March of 1908 and hearings 
were held on die bill in bodi houses. Roosevelt endorsed it at first. It 
would have increased die power of the presidency and allowed a grace-
ful retreat on die trust issue. Reaction to die bill turned hostile, however, 
in part because it increased the executive's powers. It became clear diat 
a winning coalition could not be fonned, and his administration put itself 
at ever greater distance from it. In addition, the possibility that Roosevelt 
would renege on his 1904 pledge not to run again in 1908 was dwindling, 
in part because of die hostility of business interests in the Republican 
Party. He had a good deal of popular support, however, right up to die 
Republican convention of June 1908 4 6 
4 3 Harbaugh, Fencer and Responsibility, 311; and Bringhurst, Antitrust and the Oil 
Monopoly, 140. 
4 4 Joseph Bucklin Bishop, Theodore Roosevelt and His Time: Shown in His Own Let-
ters (New York, 1920). 
4 5 Arthur M. Johnson, "Antitrust Policy in Transition, 1908: Ideal and Reality," Mis-
sissippi Valley Historical Review 48 (1961): 415-434; and Sklar, The Corporate Recon-
struction, 228-285, provide the background on the Hepburn Bill. 
4 6 "When pennanent chairman Henry Cabot Lodge referred to Roosevelt by name in 
a keynote address as 'the most abused and most popular man in the United States today,' 
the convention exploded with a spontaneous demonstration of support for him, inter-
spersed with chants of Tour, Four, Four Years More.' The demonstration lasted forty-
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The retreat on the trust issue is reflected in the trust cases the 
Roosevelt administration filed and those it decided not to file in late 1907 
and 1908. Roosevelt explicitiy directed his attorney general not to file a 
suit against International Harvester, and when asked to do so, offered no 
objection to a U.S. Steel merger in the midst of the Panic of 1907. 4 7 The 
Antitrust Division filed only seven suits in 1908, down from fourteen and 
nine in the two preceding years. None of the seven involved a major 
industrial firm, although two involved major railroads. The Supreme 
Court also took the opportunity in February 1908 of giving the Sherman 
Act a pro-business thrust by unanimously applying it to unions.4 8 The Taft 
administration continued this trend at first, filing only three cases in 1909, 
and only one against a major firm, the Sugar Trust. Taken together, the 
softening of Roosevelt's stance, the declining prospects of his renomina-
tion, and Taft's election and initial caution arguably changed expectations 
from the peak of antitrust rhetoric and filings in 1907. Real output 
increased by 14 percent from January 1908 to January 1909, and another 
17 percent by January of 1910, for a total increase of one-third in two 
years. 
Policy under Taft became gradually less cautious, the number and 
notoriety of the defendants increasing. Fifteen cases were brought in 
1910, eight in industries involved in die processing or sale of agricultural 
products: tobacco, meat packing and livestock trade (four cases), sugar, 
grocery retailing, butter and egg trade, cotton, and tallow, oleo oil and 
olesterin. This strict course had Taft's backing, but was largely charted by 
his Attorney General, George Wickersham. In September 1911, Wicker-
sham predicted that suits would be filed against 100 corporations and diat 
corporate officials would serve time 4 9 It also bears emphasis diat under 
the prevailing view, the finding that a particular practice—such as Stan-
dard's contracts with the railroads—violated the Sherman Act implied 
divestiture as the remedy. 
Taft's Antitrust Division filed its most spectacular suit against U.S. 
Steel, charging illegal merger and cartelization. The October 1911 case 
seven minutes." Donald F. Anderson, William Howard Taft: A Conservatives Conception 
of the Presidency (Ithaca, N.Y., 1973), 38. 
4 ' See Pringle, Roosevelt, 445, on the first episode and Harbaugh, Power and Respon-
sibility, 314, on the second. Judge Gary and Frick claimed that U.S. Steel's acquisition of 
Tennessee Coal and Iron would save it from bankruptcy, Roosevelt later claimed he 
replied, "that while I could not advise them to take the action proposed, I felt it no pub-
lic duty of mine to interpose any objection." Both episodes gave him political trouble later. 
4 8 In Loewe v. Lawlor, discussed in Sklar, Corporate Reconstruction, 223-224. 
4 9 New York Times, 23 Sept. 1911, p. 2 col. 2; New York Times, 2A Sept. 1911, p. 1 
col. 7; Pringle, Roosevelt, 669. 
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was based in part on the acquisition that Roosevelt had approved in the 
midst of the 1907 Panic. Roosevelt was mentioned by name in the suit, 
and the defendants included Morgan, Rockefeller, Carnegie, Schwab, 
Perkins, Gary, and Frick. 5 0 Roosevelt used the opportunity to paint him-
self as the friend of "good trusts" and to criticize the Taft administrations 
indiscriminate attack on all large firms. Wickersham's policies turned out 
to be so unpopular with business that Republican finances suffered in the 
1912 election, and Standard Oil and International Harvester supported 
Roosevelt's Bull Moose candidacy.51 The case against International Har-
vester filed in April of 1912 was turned into another barb aimed at 
Roosevelt, who was alleged to have been soft on the "farm machinery 
trust." 
As in 1907, businessmen claimed that the attacks hurt them. Taft 
acknowledged the possible harm: "A reform of any evil is bound to pro-
duce for a time not disaster, we may hope, but difficult situations that 
may make business halt." 5 2 However, he vowed that "we are going to 
enforce that law or die in the attempt."5 3 His reasons for doing so 
included his opposition to the trusts, his fidelity to "enforcing the law," 
and, paradoxically, a recognition that the law went too far. He admitted 
to banker Frank Vanderlip that the law put the railroads "in an impossi-
ble position" but "proposed to enforce the law to the letter, and by mak-
ing it obnoxious secure its reasonable change." 5 4 
Contemporary economists also saw a connection between trust pol-
icy and business conditions. Wesley Clair Mitchell held an eclectic view 
of business cycles that tended to favor monetary factors. However, he 
attributed the slump of 1911 to the trust question. "Throughout the year 
. . . enterprise on the part of large capitalists was materially checked by 
uncertainty regarding the legal position of business combinations."55 
The 1911 decisions in Standard Oil and American Tobacco also had 
legislative repercussions. The two "trusts" were dissolved, but the disso-
5 0 Paolo E. Coletta, The Presidency of William Howard Taft (Lawrence, Kans., 1973), 
159. U.S. Steel had qualified as a "good trust" in Roosevelt's eyes, and Roosevelt claimed 
that Taft himself had approved of the merger when he was in Roosevelt's cabinet. The suit 
contributed to the split in the Republican party that led Taft and Roosevelt each to enter 
the race against Wilson in 1912. Mowry, Era of Roosevelt, 291. 
5 1 Anderson, Taft, 82. 
5 2 Wall Street Journal, 7 Oct. 1911, p. 1 col. 4. 
5 3 Quoted in Mowry, Era of Roosevelt, 288. 
5 4 Sklar, Corporate Reconstruction, 369, n. 58, quoting correspondence of Frank 
Vanderlip. 
5 5 Mitchell, Business Cycles, 85. John Bates Clark (after whom a prestigious econom-
ics prize was named) and John Maurice Clark also claimed that "breaking up too many 
corporations at once would be highly disturbing in the realm of business." John Bates 
Clark and John Maurice Clark, The Control of Trusts (New York, 1912), 44. 
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lution plans were widely viewed as ineffective. Standard Oil reverted to 
the earlier "community of interest" that had been assumed after the orig-
inal trust form had been abandoned and before the holding company 
form was adopted. What is more, the court enunciated a "rule of reason" 
that was not popular witii Congress. The ensuing turmoil on the trust 
issue ended in the 1914 Clayton and Federal Trade Commission Acts. 
Other contributing factors included the Supreme Court's 1912 A. B. Dick 
decision, which supported the right of a patentee to require purchasers 
to also buy unpatented supplies from the patentee. 
The election of 1912 was dominated by the trust issue. The incum-
bent Taft was in favor of applying the Sherman Act across die board, but 
was resigned to losing the election and did comparatively litde campaign-
ing. 5 6 Roosevelt was the champion of the "good trust, bad trust" 
approach, and his Progressive, "New Nationalist" platform included a 
proposed federal trade commission with regulatory powers over busi-
ness.5 7 The cornerstone of Woodrow Wilson's "New Freedom" became 
die fight against monopoly crafted by his advisor, Louis Brandeis. Wilson, 
like Taft, was emphatic in rejecting the "good trust" idea. 
Once in the White House, Wilson continued Taft's policy of aggres-
sive filings, but increasingly came under the influence of Brandeis who 
urged broader reform and a decidedly pro-small-business approach.58 
United Shoe, the Chicago Board of Trade, Burroughs Adding Machine, 
Kodak, American Telephone and Telegraph, American Can, and a num-
ber of railroads were the subject of Sherman Act suits during Wilson's 
first year as president.59 "More than anything else," writes Thomas 
McCraw, "executives of both peripheral and center firms wanted cer-
tainty: a bright line between legality and illegality."60 In response to the 
clamor for reform, J. P. Morgan and other financiers withdrew from some 
5 6 After his defeat, Taft did however write a defense of the 1911 court decisions and 
argued against changing the antitrust law. William Howard Taft, The Antitrust Act and the 
Supreme Court (1914). 
5 7 Thomas K. McCraw, Prophets of Regulation: Charles Francis Adams, Louis Bran-
deis, James M. Landis, Alfred E. Kahn (Cambridge, Mass., 1984), 116. 
5 8 Indeed, Brandeis' muckraking on the trust issue, in articles and a popular book, 
Other People's Money and How Bankers Use It, helped set the stage for the Federal 
Reserve Act, which was viewed as an effort to rein in Wall Street, and for the 1914 anti-
trust legislation. McCraw, Prophets of Regulation, 114. 
5 9 The year 1913 also marked the temporary modification of the New Jersey corpora-
tion laws through the so-called Seven Sisters Act, which Wilson signed in January 1913 
while still governor of New Jersey. It was repealed in 1920. Henry P. Seager and Charles 
A. Gulick, Trust and Corporation Problems (New York, 1929), 362-365. 
6 0 McCraw, Prophets of Regulation, 116. 
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of the boards of directors on which diey sat. 6 1 Reform of antitrust had 
been one of Wilson's promises, but in view of deteriorating business con-
ditions, he struck a conciliatory pose. "The antagonism between business 
and government is over," he told Congress in January of 1914. 6 2 The 
Federal Trade Commission Act, signed in September of 1914, was a 
response to the call for a stable regulatory body for the trust question. 
The Clayton Act, whose final version was passed and signed in October 
1914, was an effort to trim back what Congress viewed as the Supreme 
Court's too liberal interpretation of the Sherman Act and to deal widi 
specific "abuses." 6 3 Real output per capita, which had been constant 
under Taft's administration, peaked in January 1913, and declined 
steadily over the next two years, even before die outbreak of hostilities in 
Europe in August 1914. 
At least at the level of appearances, contemporaries still saw a con-
nection between business conditions and antitrust, as they had in 1907 
and 1911. According to Thomas McCraw, "Although nobody fully under-
stood the connection between the business cycle and the program of the 
New Freedom, everyone understood diat if Wilson were regarded as 
antibusiness during a period of economic downturn, then the Democratic 
party would suffer in the off-year elections of 1914. This was one reason 
why Congress balked at voting adequate appropriations for the new 
FTC." 6 4 
Was the economic importance of antitrust in this period as important 
as the political controversy suggests? Table 2 shows that of the ten larg-
est industrial firms in 1911, the top four were sued during the Roosevelt 
and Taft initiatives of 1906-07 and 1911-12. Seven of the ten were the 
subject of antitrust suits over the entire period, 1890-1914, and Ameri-
can Sugar Refining and the meatpacking firms Armour and Swift were 
sued three times each. The typical remedy sought was divestiture. The 
assets of just the seven defendants among the top ten firms in 1911 
amounted to $3.5 billion, or 21 percent of total manufacturing assets in 
1909, the closest year with available data. 
These figures deal with the scope of restructuring and with odier 
remedies actually sought. However, changing estimates of the probability 
of a much larger, potentially disastrous antitrust campaign may have had 
more of an influence on economic activity than actual cases. Fluctuations 
6 1 Ray Strannard Baker, Woodrow Wilson: Life and Letters (New York, 1968), 367. 
The event was hailed as the "surrender of the Money Trust.'' 
6 2 Quoted in McCraw, Prophets of Regulation, 118. 
6 3 Detailed histories of these two pieces of legislation appear in Seager and Gulick, 
Trust and Corporation Problems, chap. 20, and McCraw, Prophets of Regulation, 114-135. 
6 4 McCraw, Prophets of Regulation, 126. 
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"No Molly Coddling Here.'7 • Roosevelt's big stick applied to the trusts. (This illustra-
tion originally appeared in the New York Globe, and is reproduced from Albert Shaw, A 
Cartoon History of Roosevelt's Career (New York, 1910).) 
in actual cases were largely relevant for their signal value about future 
policy. According to the "bad news principle," changes in the likelihood 
of unfavorable future outcomes—for example, massive divestitures— 
govern the decision to invest now or wait.6 5 A small but temporary prob-
ability of catastrophe creates an incentive to wait before investing. Most 
of the gains from an investment will still be available even after the crisis 
has passed. 
We would be hard pressed to estimate the probabilities of antitrust 
initiatives that could have taken place but did not. However, we can get 
6 5 The "bad news principle" is due to Ben S. Bernanke, "Irreversibility, Uncertainty, 
and Cyclical Investment," Quarterly Journal of Economics 98 (Feb. 1983): 85-106. 
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a sense of how extensive such an initiative could have been. Total assets 
of the top hundred industrial firms in 1911 amounted to $8.9 billion, or 
roughly half of all manufacturing capital. Most and perhaps nearly all of 
those firms had grown through merger, and most engaged in anticompet-
itive practices. Consequendy, a much larger fraction of assets than were 
actually attacked were susceptible to a thorough and consistendy applied 
antitrust initiative. A thorough deconcentration was in fact Tafts stated 
aim in 1911: "We must get back to competition: If it is impossible, then 
let us go to socialism, for there is no way between." On another occasion, 
he promised to break up and force competition on any trusts that had 
violated the Sherman Act. 6 6 Many critics of early antitrust enforcement 
have in fact argued that the government could and should have gone 
much further but lost courage and passed up the opportunity to restore 
competition. 
V. Antitrust and Management Response 
How did business managers respond to the shifting legal environment 
and the fluctuating politics of antitrust? There is litde doubt that antitrust 
policy affected the choice between various forms of organization. The 
record of the E. I. du Pont Powder Company is probably among the most 
extensive, illustrating the importance management attached to having a 
safe legal haven, as well as the ultimate vulnerability to legal attack of that 
presumed safe haven. Chandler and Salsbury show that emerging anti-
trust policy during Theodore Roosevelt's first term delivered the decisive 
argument for du Pont in favor of full integration over other alternatives in 
1903. Edward Walker, a Chicago attorney retained by Du Pont to advise 
on the consolidation, predicted that the looser holding company form 
would prove vulnerable in the pending Northern Securities case. "I 
would avoid all entangling alliances or contracts, but stand simply on the 
legality of your incorporation and the management and conduct of its 
coiporate business."6 7 However, Du Pont's merger turned out to be vul-
nerable to the Sherman Act as well. The government's suit, filed in July 
1907, resulted in an unfavorable June 1911 ruling and subsequent dives-
titure. Du Pont management apparendy did not take the prospect of 
divestiture seriously, and the ruling came as a surprise. As Chandler and 
6 6 Wall Street Journal 7 Oct. 1911, p. 1 col. 4; and Pringle, Roosevelt, 669. 
6 7 Alfred D. Chandler, Jr. and Stephen Salsbury, Pierre S. du Pont and the Making of 
the Modern Corporation (New York, 1971), 113 and generally 112-119. 
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"Will You Please Hush!" • Business blamed Roosevelt's boisterous rhetoric for capital 
market jitters. (This illustration originally appeared in the New York Herald, and is repro-
duced from Albert Shaw, A Cartoon History of Roosevelt's Career (New York, 1910).) 
Salsbury make clear, substantial managerial effort was devoted to fighting 
the case and dealing with the forced divestiture. 
Clearly, if shifting legal standards affected the choice of organiza-
tional form, and if organizational form has an influence on the conduct of 
business, then uncertainty over what is permissible should delay impor-
tant decisions. Are there recorded instances in which management explic-
idy deferred or altered its investment plans in response to antitrust policy 
uncertainty? If managers had wanted to do so, die general public discus-
sion certainly provided the arguments and vocabulary. Martin Sklar 
observes that "the inhibitive impact of the uncertainty of law on market 
activity was a continuous theme among capitalists from the turn of cen-
tury to 1914." He cites as an example the 1908 statement before Con-
gress by the president of Yale & Towne Manufacturing: "The law should 
be known and fixed in advance . . . so that business men may make their 
plans on a solid foundation."68 To this we can add the observations cited 
earlier by the business press, economists and the ever-candid President 
Taft himself. 
Probably the most extensive collection of business opinion on the 
Sklar, Corporate Reconstruction, 204, n. 34. 
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6 9 National Civic Federation, Department of Regulation of Industrial Corporations, 
The Trust Problem: Opinions of 16,000 Representative Americans (New York, 1912), 9, 11 
and 276. 
7 0 Sklar, Corporate Reconstruction, 204, n. 34, cites Vanderlip to Stillman, 3 Feb. 
1910, 3 June 1910, 17 Oct. 1911; Stillman to Vanderlip, 16 Sept. 1910; Vanderlip to 
Lyman J. Gage, 28 Feb. 1910; Frank A. Vanderlip Papers, Rare Book and Manuscript 
Library, Columbia University. 
effects of the Sherman Act appears in the National Civic Federation's 
1912 survey on The Trust Problem. Manufacturers, bankers, merchants 
and leaders of other organizations were asked eleven questions, including: 
"What caused or causes the present disturbed business conditions?" The 
notion that trust-busting hurt business confidence runs almost continu-
ously through the hundreds of responses from the business sector: "Dis-
turbed business conditions are due to lack of certainty as to what is or is 
not legal under the Sherman Law, with the administration forcing it so 
drastically," argued the president of Lackawana Steel. Similarly, the pres-
ident of Oliver Iron Mining emphasized the damaging aspects of "the 
uncertainty as to the exact meaning of the Sherman Law; the apparent 
unfavorable attitude of government officials towards large corporations 
and their efforts to return to destructive competition." The president of 
Sprague Warner (wholesale grocers) agreed, seeing "indiscriminate pub-
lic antagonism to corporations, fostered by an indiscriminate press and 
self-seeking politicians; uncertainty as to the scope of the Anti-Trust Act," 
as creating a climate not conducive to business.69 
Business leaders did more than blame the Sherman Act publicly. 
Sldar continues his discussion of business opinion by pointing to some 
business correspondence: "Similarly typical along these lines, but more 
concretely indicative, are private discussions in National City Bank presi-
dent Frank A. Vanderlip's correspondence with James Stillman and oth-
ers over deferment of investment programs by railways and 
manufacturing corporations pending clarification of the antitrust law." 7 0 
To be sure, a cynic might contend that businesses chafing under the 
Sherman Act might delude themselves and incorrecdy place blame on 
the government for investment plans deferred or abandoned. On the 
other hand, the marketplace imposes a penalty on actions that are based 
on erroneous beliefs and analysis, so that we can attach some weight to 
these private assertions. 
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VI. Statistical Evidence 
The statistical work here regresses quarterly changes in aggregate produc-
tion on current and past antitrust filings, with those filings grouped into 
major and minor cases. The results provide a formal test of the charges 
made in 1907 and again in 1911 that antitrust hurt business confidence 
and lowered output. As previously mentioned, the comments of business-
cycle pioneer Mitchell and recent work on the effects of political uncer-
tainty on investment suggest that unstable antitrust policies may affect 
investment, though secondary effects on the purchase of consumer dura-
bles and even consumption are possible. Unfortunately, no investment 
data at monthly, quarterly or even annual frequencies exist for this period. 
However, we do have detailed data on pig iron production, which offers 
a proxy for private investment and durable goods output. Consequendy, 
I also present results using quarterly changes in pig iron production. In 
addition, the theoretical results on uncertainty and investment suggest 
that stock price volatility may reflect rapidly changing expectations. 
Empirical work by Christine Romer in fact links greater stock volatility to 
declines in purchased consumer durables. Hence, I also include stock 
price volatility as an explanatory variable. This captures factors like the 
fluctuating debate on free-silver, aspects of the trust issue not measured 
by case filings, as well as other uncertainty-inducing influences. 
The regressions in Table 3 take the form: 
Y t = a + b 0 J t + b j ^ + b 2 J t _ 2 + c 0 N t + c ^ + c 2 N t _ 2 + dV t+ e t , 
where Y t is defined as the change in the natural log of aggregate 
production (or of pig iron production) over the three months of 
quarter t, J t is the number of major cases filed in quarter t, N t is the 
number of other (minor) cases filed in quarter t, V t is the natural log 
of the standard deviation of the monthly return of the Dow indus-
trial average over the three months of quarter t and the two preced-
ing months, and 8 t is the error term. 
Since the data are available monthly, there are nearly as many (over-
lapping) quarters as there are months of data. Using all quarters results 
in an efficient use of the data. However, since the observations overlap, 
die resulting regressions will have autocorrelated errors, which means 
that the estimated standard errors and t-statistics may be biased. Conse-
quendy, Table 3 provides both estimates based on quarters ending in all 
mondis, as well as successive estimates based on quarters ending in 
months 1, 4, 7 and 10 (January, April, etc.), months 2, 5, 8 and 11 (Feb-
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ruary, May, etc.) and 3, 6, 9 and 12 (Mar, June, etc.). This second set of 
results is based on regressions diat do not have autocorrelated errors and 
diat yield unbiased standard errors and t-statistics. 
Consider the first set of results for output in the columns labeled 
"all months." Each extra major case per quarter is associated with a 
decline of output of -1.55 percent in the same quarter, -2.18 percent 
the next quarter, and -0.77 percent in the quarter after that. The 
total effect is therefore -4.50 percent. In contrast, minor cases are 
associated with a weak increase in output, suggesting perhaps that 
antitrust was being channeled away from large firms. Finally, a dou-
bling of stock price volatility (a 100 percent increase) results in a 
-3.00 percent decline of output. Although the estimated standard 
errors in the first set of results are possibly biased downward and the 
t-statistics therefore inflated upward, the estimates in the other col-
umns are not. These show that an increase in cases against major 
firms is correlated with or followed by a decline in aggregate output. 
The effect of stock price volatility is also confirmed. 7 1 
Regressions using pig iron production, my proxy for investment 
and durable goods purchases, confirm the results based on aggregate 
output. Each extra major case per quarter is accompanied by a 
cumulative decline of pig iron production of -13.81 percent, each 
extra minor case per quarter is accompanied by a slight, but statisti-
cally questionable increase, and a doubling of stock price volatility 
lowers pig iron production by -8.82 percent. Again, the results for 
non-overlapping quarters confirm that effects of major cases and of 
stock market volatility are unlikely to be due to chance. Each quar-
terly partition has at least one lag of the major case variable with a 
t-statistic in excess of 2.00, and all individual coefficients on major 
cases are negative. 
' 1 The discussion of particular statistical results here and in the next paragraph is 
intended to help the reader interpret the full set of coefficients in Table 3. Clearly, none 
of these results represents the "true," precise effects of an antitrust case, in particular 
since a count of cases is a crude though perhaps serviceable proxy for the stringency of 
underlying enforcement. Estimated coefficients for antitrust cases will vary depending on 
the period covered and on the other variables included in a regression. In regression 
results that I do not report here, estimates that exclude stock volatility or that focus on 
specific subperiods generate somewhat different results. In all cases, however, the 
observed correlation between major case filings and changes in industrial production 
remains negative. The cumulative effect of major case filings also remains statistically sig-
nificant when the years 1907 and 1908 are excluded or when the regressions focus only on 
1909-1914 (the period after the Panic of 1907). 
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Table 3 
Regressions of Quarterly Changes in Manufacturing, Agricultural and 
Other Production and Quarterly Changes in Pig Iron Production on 
Current and Past Antitrust Case Filings, and Log Volatility of Dow 
Industrial Returns, Quarters Starting May 1891 and Ending July 1914. 
Quarters ending months: 
All months 1,4,7,10 2,5,8,11 3,6,9,12 
Coeff t-value Coeff t-value Coeff t-vahie Coeff t-value 
Dependent Variable: Quarterly Change in Production 
Major Cases 
t 
t-J 
t-2 
Sum 
Minor Cases 
t 
t-l 
t-2 
Sum 
Log Volatility 
Log Volatility 
-1 .55% (3.12) 
-2.18 (4.37) 
-0.77 (1.56) 
-4.50% 
-0.22% (1.11) 
0.49 (2.26) 
0.35 (1.60) 
0 .61% 
-3.00% (4.31) 
-8.82% (3.45) 
-0.70% (0.72) 
-1.50 (1.55) 
-1.42 (1.44) 
-3.63% 
-0.44% (1.14) 
0.65 (1.36) 
0.17 (0.38) 
0.38% 
-2.78% (2.19) 
Quarterly Change 
-0.73% (0.21) 
-1.86 (0.05) 
-8.26 (2.30) 
-10.86% 
-1.74% (1.30) 
2.35 (1.43) 
0.05 (0.03) 
0.66% 
-8.78% (1.97) 
-1.96% (2.35) 
-2.63 (3.13) 
-0.40 (0.50) 
-4.99% 
-0.02% (0.06) 
0.41 (1.33) 
0.34 (1.00) 
0.73% 
-3.07% (2.74) 
-2.65% (1.00) 
-5.40 (2.04) 
-5.73 (2.28) 
-13.77% 
-0.04% (0.05) 
0.58 (0.60) 
1.32 (1.22) 
1.85% 
-8.79% (2.42) 
-1.86% (2.13) 
-2.42 (2.75) 
-0.50 (0.57) 
-4.79% 
-0.35% (0.88) 
0.51 (1.11) 
0.49 (1.12) 
0.65% 
-3.31% (2.45) 
-4.01% (1.14) 
-7.07 (2.00) 
-5.13 (1.46) 
-16.21 
-0.09% (0.06) 
0.37 (0.20) 
2.08 (1.19) 
2.36% 
-9.08% (1.63) 
Dependent Variable: 
Major Cases 
t -2 .43% (1.34) 
t-l -5.05 (2.77) 
t-2 -6,32 (3.53) 
Sum -13.81% 
Minor Cases 
t -0.52% (0.72) 
t-l 0.98 (1.26) 
t-2 1.27 (1.62) 
Sum 1.73% 
in Pig Iron Production 
Notes: The production index is the seasonally adjusted Babson index from Geoffrey H. Moore, 
Business Cycle Indicators 2 (Princeton, N.J., 1961). It includes manufacturing, mining, agricul-
tural production, construction contracts, railway traffic, electricity production, and foreign trade, 
all value-added weighted. The log of stock market volatility is the natural log of the five month 
moving standard deviation of Dow Industrial returns (three months of the quarter plus two pre-
ceding months), with returns based on end-of-month values, from Phyllis S. Pierce, ed., The 
Dow Jones Averages, 1885-1980 (Homewood, 1982). The pig iron regressions include unre-
ported monthly or quarterly dummies. Pig iron data are from U.S. Department of Commerce, 
Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the United States, 1789-1945 (Washington, D.C., 
1949), Series App. 10. 
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Statistical correlations raise familiar questions. First, the results 
may be due to reverse correlation—declining output or expectations 
of declining output may lead antitrust authorities to file cases. How-
ever, it seems unlikely that antitrust authorities can predict the busi-
ness cycle. Even if they partly anticipate changes in output, they 
would have to be able to undertake an investigation and file a case 
on relatively short notice, or have a portfolio of pending investiga-
tions from which cases can be quickly filed. 
A second question concerns the significance of case filings. 
Rather than reflecting antitrust policy, antitrust enforcement against 
large firms may reflect the general tenor of an administration's eco-
nomic policy. This objection has greater force today, since the fed-
eral government's policies now cover not just antitrust, but also 
environmental, labor and corporate tax policy, for example. How-
ever, even to the extent that this objection applies at the turn of the 
century, the results are still interesting because the suggest that anti-
trust is a useful proxy for economic policy that affects output. 
VII. Other Times 
It is possible that purely chance factors account for the correlation 
between major cases and declines in output during the years from 
1891 to 1914. The best protection against flukes is replication with a 
new data set and under new circumstances. Here I will sketch out 
the nature of the evidence for other time periods. 
The struggle over the "trust and corporation" problem did not 
end in 1914. In fact, it resurfaced at several points over the next 
decades, sometimes with the rhetoric and political overtones remi-
niscent of Roosevelt, Taft and Wilson. At other times, antitrust was 
scaled back and contained to the level seen under McKinley. A brief 
review of some key episodes suggests that while other factors, nota-
bly declines in the price level, have substantial effects on output, 
output declines typically accompany major "trust-busting" cam-
paigns. 
The 1919-21 antitrust initiative came in response to World War 
I inflation and the "war profiteering" controversy. It also accompa-
nied a major economic downturn. Concrete actions included investi-
gations and cases filed against the major meat packers, FTC attacks 
on association activities, and high-profile state-level investigations in 
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"The Usual Victim." • The battle between the trusts and the trust-busters harms an 
innocent bystander. (This illustration originally appeared in the New York Herald, and is 
reproduced from Albert Shaw, A Cartoon History of Roosevelt's Career (New York, 
1910).) 
New York and Illinois. 7 2 The price-level decline of 56 percent from 
May 1920 through June 1921 undoubtedly did much to aggravate 
this downturn. 7 3 However, the anti-business attacks began earlier, in 
August 1919, and the recession began in early 1920, before the fall 
in prices. 7 4 
The 1924-1929 relaxation of antitrust under Coolidge, and in 
particular under his chief antitrust official, "Colonel" William Dono-
van, accompanied one of the most spectacular peacetime expansions 
of the 20th century. Both agencies actively promoted trade associa-
tion activities and mergers, and by the late 1920s, prominent anti-
trust experts declared the Sherman Act dead. A wave of mergers 
proceeded unchecked by the antitrust authorities. Clearly, the 
Coolidge administration pursued pro-business policies across the 
' 2 Robert F. Himmelberg, The Origins of the National Recovery Administration: Busi-
ness, Government, and the Trade Association Issue, 1921-1933 (New York, 1976), 5-20. 
7 3 Friedman and Schwartz, A Monetary History, 231-232. 
' 4 Himmelberg, Origins, 7. 
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board, making it difficult to isolate the effects of antitrust, but 
restrained antitrust was a major component of the Coolidge pro-
gram. 
The potential importance of antitrust, either taken alone or as a 
flagship business policy, is illustrated by the shift under Hoover. On 
October 25, 1929, Hoover's attorney general, William Mitchell, 
announced at the annual convention of the American Bar Associa-
tion that the newly installed administration would reverse the here-
tofore lax enforcement of the antitrust laws. Mitchell delivered this 
prepared speech, whose contents or fundamental message could 
have reached Wall Street a day or two earlier, in the middle of the 
week-long October 1929 stock market decline that started on Octo-
ber 23. Nor was the speech empty rhetoric. As Robert Himmelberg's 
detailed account shows, "one by one—often with long intervals 
between the public initiation of a new case—many of the most noto-
rious organizations (some of whose programs had, initially at least, 
been approved by Donovan) were attacked, in nearly every case with 
prompt success/" 7 5 The government's rediscovery of antitrust 
extended beyond trade associations to prominent entertainment 
mergers and the "Radio Trust," which included RCA, General Elec-
tric and Westinghouse. The 1931-33 period was, like 1920-21, 
marked by a major decline in the price level and monetary contrac-
tion, and this probably accounts for the severity of the output 
decline. However, the abrupt and unexpected shift in antitrust initi-
ated with Mitchell's October 1929 speech is arguably a possible 
cause for the crash and the 1930 recession. 7 6 
The 1933 National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA), as Himmel-
berg shows, represented an attempt to restore lax antitrust—the sta-
tus quo ante under Coolidge—in exchange for concessions to labor. 
Its passage and early enforcement were marked by a remarkable 
economic expansion in the second and third quarters of 1933. That 
expansion has puzzled economists who regarded the NIRA as merely 
a monopolizing device. Typically, they dismissed the boom as artifi-
cial, as due to purchases made in advance of expected monopoly 
price hikes. However, that explanation is inconsistent with the sharp 
7 5 Himmelberg, Origins, 93. 
7 6 I discuss the 1920s policies at greater length in George Bittlingmayer, "The 1920s 
Boom, the Great Crash, and After," working paper, Graduate School of Management, 
University of California, Davis, 1995. 
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increase in stock prices and output even in sectors that might be 
expected to be victims rather than beneficiaries of monopoly price 
increases. 7 7 
After the NIRA was declared unconstitutional in 1935, the New 
Deal waffled on antitrust until late 1937, when it reversed itself and 
initiated a new round of antitrust enforcement, especially after the 
appointment of Thurman Arnold as antitrust chief. These actions 
were accompanied by a major stock market decline in October 1937, 
increased stock-market volatility, and the 1938-39 recession. 7 8 
In separate work, I have examined the antitrust initiatives in 
individual industry sectors for 1947-1992. Case filings were corre-
lated with declines in investment, and the revival o f antitrust in the 
late Eisenhower and early Kennedy years explains the low levels of 
investment for 1958-1962 that have puzzled economists. In particu-
lar, Kennedy's celebrated confrontation with big Steel in May 1962, 
the filing of a number of cases against major firms that summer and 
the bear market of 1962 were reminiscent of Theodore Roosevelt's 
clashes with the trusts. 7 9 
Clearly, other factors affect the business cycle. For example, a 
decline in the price level has well understood, negative effects on 
output, illustrated by the 1920-21 and 1931-1933 declines. Con-
versely, high rates of inflation also appear to reduce economic activ-
ity. However, our understanding of what causes business cycles is 
still incomplete. Quite possibly, politically volatile attacks on the 
organization of business, especially when the ultimate scope o f those 
attacks is unclear, may have been one important influence on busi-
ness activity. 
VIII . Summary and Concluding Comments 
The view that Roosevelt's and Taft's trust-busting shook business 
confidence was once widespread. At odds with textbook explanations 
' ' George Bittlingmayer, "Output and Stock Prices When Antitrust Is Suspended: The 
Effects of the NIRA," in The Causes and Consequences of Antitrust: A Public-Choice 
Perspective, ed. Fred S. McChesney and William F. Shughart II (Chicago, 111., 1995) cov-
ers the NIRA and analyses its economic and financial effects. 
7 8 George Bittlingmayer, "Stock Returns, Real Activity and the Trust Question," Jour-
nal of Finance 47 (Dec. 1992): 1701-1730, offers a brief historical treatment of this period, 
as well as an extended statistical investigation of the stock market effects of antitrust 
enforcement for 1904-1944. 
' 9 George Bittlingmayer, "Industry Investment and Regulation," working paper, Grad-
uate School of Management, University of California, Davis, 1995. 
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for the business cycle, the idea is consistent with recent theoretical 
work that shows how uncertainty, in particular political uncertainty, 
can influence investment. It is also consistent with the view that the 
modern corporation improved the organization and coordination of 
business units, and with the view that many controversial business 
practices have efficiency rationales. 
The political importance of the trusts is indisputable, their eco-
nomic importance reflected in the fact that the hundred largest 
firms, preponderantly "trusts," accounted for half of U.S. manufac-
turing capacity. Plausibly, then, an attempt to restructure big busi-
ness forcibly, in effect to undo with protracted lawsuits in 1907 or 
1912 the mergers that had taken place over the preceding two 
decades would have created substantial costs. Some forced divesti-
tures did in fact take place in the face of much controversy, and each 
new initiative raised the possibility of even more extensive restruc-
turing. That was an explicit threat under Taft and Wilson. 
It bears emphasis that while a favorable view of challenged busi-
ness practices—including the modern corporation—makes it easier 
to construct a connection between antitrust and business activity, it 
seems plausible that stepped up antitrust enforcement would have 
unsettling effects even if the "trusts" had been simple monopolies, 
as Taft himself allowed. The basic argument is aided by, but not 
wedded to, an efficiency story for the trusts and large corporations. 
The work here offers theoretical and empirical evidence for an 
old but neglected claim, it puts the unusual passion and politics of 
the trust question in a new light, and it may explain why the federal 
government's sporadic antitrust drives did not turn out as severe as 
supporters had hoped and detractors feared. 
